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Conventional SCA Techniques
The original SCA techniques depended on recognition
of circuit patterns or "clues" for the detection of
potential sneak circuits. The most common of these
circuit patterns are the H-Pattern, Y-Pattern and
Inverted-Y:
The box symbols represent arbitrary circuit
elements; in many cases the individual legs of the
patterns include switches. (The CARGO OPEN switch is
the middle horizontal leg of an H-pattern). The
inverted Y is also called a ground dome; note that
the two bottom legs terminate in different ground
levels, such as chassis ground and signal ground.
The Y-pattern is also called a power dome. The two
upper legs terminate at different power sources,
such as V1 and V2.
To facilitate the recognition of these patterns or
clues, the schematic diagrams were redrawn as
"network trees", with power sources at the top and
grounds at the bottom. In sneak circuit analysis
both positive and negative sources will be shown at
the top of the figure. Despite the aid of
computers, SCA remained a very expensive and lengthy
activity, and it is usually conducted only after the
circuit design was frozen to avoid having to repeat
it after changes. However, at this point usually
the circuit board or cabling are already in
production and it becomes very expensive to fix. In
order to reduce the effort involved in SCA and thus
enable its use earlier in the design SoHaR developed
(within a USAF Research Laboratory contract) as
technique that would permit SCA to be conducted as
part of the design activity. The technique is based
on a "bi-path" methodology which focuses on
bi-directional paths rather than particular
topologies. The technique reduces the effort by an
order of magnitude and has allowed for the
development of our automated tool, SCAT.
The SCAT Approach to Sneak Circuit Analysis
SCAT is an automated Sneak Circuit Analysis Tool
developed by SoHaR for the Air Force Research
Laboratory and currently marketed to the entire
industry as a SCA tool. SCAT differs from
conventional SCA (Sneak Circuit Analysis) techniques
in that the latter are based upon the generation
(usually automated) and analysis (mostly manual) of
network trees to identify sneak paths. In contrast,
SCAT does not require or even make use of the
traditional network trees.
The automated
procedure provides the design engineer or
reliability analyst with a simple yet powerful tool
for rapidly identifying and correcting sneak paths.
The automated procedure is based on the fact that
sneak paths involve circuit components which can
conduct current in either direction depending upon
the switching state of the circuit. SCAT
exhaustively searches for these bidirectional
branches, which is more readily automated than
searching for specific topological circuit patterns,
as done by conventional SCA techniques. Furthermore,
the analyst's task is reduced to evaluating the
significance of specific potential sneak paths
rather than applying "clue lists" to circuit
patterns for identifying the sneak paths.
A significant issue that arises is the assurance
that sneak paths associated with interconnecting
assemblies or subsystem interfaces are not
overlooked. This issue is addressed in two ways.
First, the system compels the user to identify each
interface port of a switching circuit in terms of it
being a power input. Interfaces to power and ground
are labeled as such regardless of whether they
respectively go to power and ground directly or
through switched or un-switched loads, and they are
included within the sneak path search. SCAT was
developed to enable design engineers to perform SCA
early in the project life so that problems can be
corrected early and at minimal cost.
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